Wisdom of General Paul van Riper, USMC
Major points for:
Part 1: A Conversation with Paul van Riper (1 Self-Organizing Groups and How Combat Applies to Business)
A. Being in command and out of control, i.e., not hands-on with
everything that subordinates do. This lesson is the same one that the
法家 fǎ jiā or Legalists learned the hard way in ancient China,
that the emperor cannot control everything, that initiative must be
taken at lower levels because the emperor can't decide everything and
even important single choices often must be made immediately or almost
immediately.
B. Be in command but let the subordinates self-organize. Key decisions
made at the periphery will be better in the aggregate than a decision
made at the top. The top sets goals, but the bottom tries lots of
things and works out, laterally, the best way to do things.
C. Distinguish between
(1) so-called tame problems — problems that one is
familiar with and for which you have an internal model that lets you
deal with it in an effective way. Example: A practoced driver has no
need to analyze ordinary on-road interactions. Under ordinary
conditions, it's all been learned before.
(2) so-called wicked problems —problems that don't
fit with old models. Don't try to solve the problem before you know
what the problem is. Decide first whether this is a novel situation or
not. Maybe Iyou will need to watch for a while and determine what
its key salient factors are.
D. Interactively complex systems have great freedom of action among
parts. You can't mathematically compute outcomes beyond a step or two
(e.g., sock one guy in a crowd after a football game). What you
may be able to do is to prepare for the general ways a situation may
develop in advance, and be ready to activate a general plan depending
on the emerging conditions. As iii has said in regard to one of the
greatest of complex systems, "In essence, grand strategy is not
governed by strict scientific laws but by rules of thumb or rough
guidelines that allow policymakers to practice the art of making
informed judgments about long-term trends and trade-offs." (The Making of Future American Grand Strategy, by William C. Martel.)
Example:
As a captain in the Marines. Paul van Riper was assigned to protect an
airport that was regularly attacked by rocket fire. He had command of
200 Marines. Hee assembled the lieutenants in the company,
anintelligence officer from the battalion, an artillery forward
observer, a forward air controller, a pilot, and discussed the problem
several days. He rejected no ideas, including one person who observed
that, "It would be nice if we had daylight 24 hours a day,"
because they had discovered that rockets were only fired during times
of reduced visibility-- night time, no moonlight, etc. Total
illumination for all hours of darkness was beyond their capabilities.
Examining land on the periphery of the airfield they discovered that
certain areas were flat and dry, and were suitable for setting up and
firing rockets. Other areas could be ignored. One member of the team
had access to astronomical data (moonrise, moonset, sunrise, sunset,
etc.), so they had reduced the problem to lighting specific areas at
specific times. Then they considered the means of illumination
available to them, e.g., aircraft dropping flares, artillery firing
illumination rounds, etc. A further possibility was randomly shelling
areas where the enemy might be setting up in a position that hadn't
been illuninated, ambushes, etc. The airfield was successfully
protected against further rocket attacks. (Some of this information was
conveyed in another video that is currently not available on-line.)
Notes by Abhilash Namblar found with the Youtube posting:
SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
Who shapes Paul's thinking and inspires his work?
Col John Boyd (deceased)
BG Shimon Naveh
Gen Tony Zinni
Lt Gen Jim Mattis
MG David Fastabend
Dr. Andrew Ilachinski
Dr. Gary Klein
Dr. Williamson Murray
==========================
Part Two
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=31y3gVTU-pk (Two on leadership part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZucN4jbmJ7E (Which one comes first? 2 on leadership part 1
A Conversation with General Paul K. van Riper
Cast your net widely. It's too easy to stagnate, become oblivious to
new information because everybody in your own field is ignoring the new
stuff too. If you are in a foreign country be sure you get out among
the people.
People in charge of organizations need to task subordinates to get
involved in wide-ranging research. To do that right, you've got to
explain why that task is important, i.e., tell people what the
objective is and then they will be able to handle the logistics for
themselves. \\
"What scientists have told us is that any organization that understands
the task, understands the purpose, and receives feedback will
self-organize."
Here is something for anybody who wants to undertake nation building or
state building. "You ought to have a vision of where you want the
organization to be in the future. It ought to be a mental image of what
you want. It's the schema in your mind as to what you want the
organization to be. You ought to have some very clear objectives, that
will allow you to achieve that vision, and then assign tasks with the
associated intent or purpose for those who are going to move forward."
Slogans that are supposed to guide us -- all they do is to specified
desired outcomes, and many are vacuous or meaningless even as
statements of goals.
Treat subordinates as members of your own family, not as objects. (Sartre)
================
ttps://beta.prx.org/stories/12931 George Kenny's interview 4 August 2006
Americans do not understand insurgencies.
Colin Grey, Another Bloody Century
https://beta.prx.org/stories/12931
http://www.electricpolitics.com/media/mp3/EP2006.08.04.mp3
The US military does not understand insurgencies. After Vietnam,
military people of PVR's generation came back disillusioned and focused
on doctrine that did not apply to insurgency. Desert Storm and first
phase in Iraq handled well on the basis that period of doctrine
development.
Iraqi people must be the ones to step up and solve their problem.
Torture never gains what proponents think is going to be gained.
Rumsfeld et al. climate in "new rules" led to torture and associated
bad behavior. The admin was following treatment of individual detainees
avidly.
Sec'y Def or Service Chief
concern for the future of their institutions
transformation paper by Rummy was slogans only, no guidance to think about future,
Good handle on weapons and equip, but Rummy never worse execution of provision plans
Leader should establish positive climate == , but nobody PVR know feels its' that wa -- fear and humiliation
War ought to be planned and conducted in an effective way but see Cobra
II and/or Fiasco to see how poorly planning and conduct have been
handled.
Not doing homework in thinking about insurgency and how to deal with it.
Limit of 7 max situations that leaders can keep in their heads at the same time. 7 is a stretch.
Colin Grey, Another Bloody Century, Warfare is warfare. All the
exercises in modifying the term, extra adjectives, doesn't get us
anywhere useful.
Carl v. Clausewitz: "In war, more than any other subject, we must begin
by looking at the nature of the whole, for here, more than elsewhere,
the part and the whole must always be thought of together."
Science leads us into reductionism, which does us little good.
Can't teach war, but you can put them in touch with it as in learning
to ride a bike. Read widely and deeply to get a vicarious experience of
war in all its complexity.
Army's Futures Center at Ft. Monroe, VA
Quantico, Marines are being led to think.
You can't think of war as a problem in and of itself.
War is a part of a larger conflict with other elements of national
power, diplomacy, use of economic power, strategic communications and
information all play a part.
On cutting military budget
Can't say to cut it without specifying how we are going to meet actual
needs. Can, however, correct wasteful practices in ways that don't
improve military situation.
Could greatly increase effectiveness by concentrating on infantry as much as air and sea
1:3 ratio of destruction on air
1:hundreds or thousands. Technology, selection and training of pilots and mechanics
Exchange rations for infantry have remained constant since WW II
If had a 1:500 ratio we could achieve a great deal more.
Gen Robt Scales has the figures on infantry loss ratios.