Draft Policy for USA and its
Allies in the Middle East re Islamic State
Aaron Zappaz
Note well: In this year 2017 we will
not find it possible to fight on
the battlefield that we wish had emerged, but will of necessity fight
the enemies that are arrayed before us.
All present and future strategic and tactical moves must be made with a
deep awareness of the foundational conditions: Global Warming and
Environmental Degradation.
Refer to the Joint Chiefs for their
long-term research on these topics. Consult with UN experts on trends
in migration flows as changes in fundamentals drive them more and more
strongly. Consult with crisis management authorities in nations that
receive refugees. Depending on current state of governmental
organizations tasked with such activities as preserving arable land and
managing water use, it may be possible significantly to augment their
efforts at little cost to ourselves. NGOs may be well positioned to
conduct these operations if they are provided with adequate funds.
Investing in competent agents of change already in existence may be the
best use of national resources.
Attend to the following nine directives:
1. Review procedures used after Pearl Harbor to learn how the Empire of
Japan created soldiers who would chose to fight to the death and commit
suicide if necessary rather than to surrender, airmen who would
sacrifice their lives in kamikaze attacks on Allied naval vessels, and
those who would otherwise display extreme subservience to the emperor.
Collate and
scrutinize existing research on the already prepared sociological and
psychological research done on the typical character structures of
individuals raised in the Arab societies of the Middle East, and the
societies of Iran and Afghanistan. The extremes of rage, aggression,
and savagery fostered by and put into operation by the Islamic State do
not occur in individuals raised in other cultures, cultures with which
we are much more familiar, except, perhaps, in the case of psychopathic
serial killers.
2. Begin by giving informal support (perhaps through NGOs) to existing
organizations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nations in the region
that work for equality of women and apply themselves to education
rather
than indoctrination of both males and females, and to any other
organizations whose work tends to support human rights, security of
person and of economic sufficiency, etc. of individuals who otherwise
might succumb to IS psychological manipulation.
3. Push investigation of formative factors that tend to produce IS
fighters, and integrate new findings into pilot ameliorization projects
in a timely way.
4. Determine by the best available means all the current educational
inputs that lead to a more resilient population in the Middle East.
Consider insuring banking systems that provide small but vital loans to
foster development of useful goods and services such as local
industries and businesses that make life more livable in communities,
large and small, in fragile, failing, or failed states. Look for other
means of improving educational inputs and social controls such as
educating MDs so that they may become competent to discuss mental
health, child rearing, and other such issues with their patients.
5. Broaden the responsibilities of intelligence services in the region to
identify and, where possible, protect and/or provide unobtrusive
support to young people with leadership potential. Work toward finding
a modality suitable to the region by which to school those with
leadership potentials in the competencies that a similar individual in
the West would have received in the family, through the educational
system, through individual efforts to accept challenges in the real
world, and through service in the government leading to ever greater
levels of responsibility and competency. (Review the personal histories
of people such as Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and
also review the personal histories of the main figures in the Student
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and similar organizations.)
6. Improve Self Governance: At present there is competent leadership for the
Kurds. Careful attention should be paid to Afghanistan, and the
situation in Iraq should be given very close scrutiny as well. The
lesson of the Nouri al-Maliki administration must be kept in mind.
United States or other NATO help should not substitute for the armed
forces of Iraq as the force elements that actually interact with IS or
other unfriendly forces, but continued training opportunities for Iraqi
troops should receive high priority.
Note Well: Currently (January, 2017 but pre-Trump) the situation in Syria is still
fluid. However, it appears that Russian aid will keep Assad in power.
The contending rebel forces have no very competent leadership. They
will become more and more marginal if they cannot unite under one
leader. Assad may decide to expunge them one-by-one before taking on
the IS forces. Perhaps the worst alternative to emerge would be Assad
in fairly confident control of most of the country, but with IS in firm
control of a refuge for their forces that operate outside of Syria.
7. Consultations should begin immediately with NATO and/or other
interested nations, rebel command staff with whom we can arrange
adequate communications and/or contacts, ex-patriates and other
informal sources of intelligence, etc. to examine and pursue research
and intelligence findings bearing on the creation of a unified command
structure by and for the rebels. Ideally, out of such a process will
emerge a leader capable of securing the loyalty of other rebel leaders
and gaining the allegiance of the civilian population of Syria. This
process will not bear fruit in a few weeks or months. Something like it
should have been initiated before the invasion of Iraq by the George W.
Bush administration. However, putting it off any longer will only
multiply the difficulties and the casualties of war.
8. Military leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere should be
tasked to review and maximize the capability of US and NATO or other
allies to execute rapid reactions to break-out situations engineered by
IS or other insurgent forces. It would be inappropriate for Western
forces to be in the front lines for governments such as those of
Afghanistan or Iraq. However, these and other nations in the region
lack air power to handle such missions. The US should consider the use
of bomber drones in Syria to attack large concentrations of IS forces,
especially if they occur in open country.
9. Be cognizant of the long-term circumstances. A successful strategy will not likely result in a rapid dismemberment
of IS forces. For that reason the US will face a long period of
expenditures in the region. A politically independent organization
should
be tasked to cost out the various approaches the US might use for the
long term in the Middle East, and these computations should be made
freely available to the public for use in policy debates.
Management of states-side sequelae of this irregular war is left to a
separate policy analysis.
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